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Since the escalating civil war in the former Yugoslavia began in
1990, the conflagration has engendered innumerable headlines report-
ing ethnically motivated barbarity.' In response to these atrocities,
* J.D. Candidate, 1995; B.A. University of Maryland, 1992. I would like to thank
P.J. O'Rourke for his eloquent defense of writings on all topics horrible:
If I had a chance to visit another planet, I wouldn't want to go to Six Flags Over
Mars or ride through the artificial ammonia lake in a silicone-bottomed boat at
Venusian Cypress Gardens. I'd want to see the planet's principal features-what
makes it tick. Well, the planet I've got a chance to visit is Earth, and Earth's
principal features are chaos and war. I think I'd be a fool to spend years here and
not have a look.
P.J. O'RouRKE, HOLIDAYS IN HELL 1 (1988).
1. News stories include both statistics and individuals' stories. For a sampling of
headlines, see William Drozdiak, Serbs Raped 20,000, EC Team Says, WASH. POST, Jan. 9,
1993, at A12; John M. Goshko, U.S. Human Rights Report Charges Serb Drive "Borders on
Genocide," WASH. POST, Jan. 20 1993, at A4; Peter Maass, The Rapes in Bosnia, A Muslim
School Girl's Account, WASH. PoST, Dec. 27, 1992, at Al.
Seventeen distinct ethnic minorities lived in the former Yugoslavia, making it the most
diverse country in Eastern Europe. Before it disintegrated, Yugoslavia was 36.2% Serb,
19.7% Croat, 8.9% Bosnian Muslim, 7.8% Slovene, 7.7% Albanian, and 5% Macedonian,
with no other ethnic group comprising more than 3% of the population. CENTRAL INTEL-
LIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK 1991, at 343 (1991) [hereinafter FACT BOOK
1991]; BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 7773, BACKGROUND NOTES: YuoosLAviA 1 (1989) [hereinafter BACK-
GROUND NOTES]; Elizabeth L. Pearl, Punishing Balkan War Criminals: Could the End of
Yugoslavia Provide an End to Victors' Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1373, 1375 (1993)
(noting the condemnation by governments, the UN, and NGOs of ethnic cleansing in the
former Yugoslavia).
Not everyone views the brutality in the Balkans in terms of race. For alternate per-
spectives, see Dognian Denitch, Now, Bosnia Without Bosnians, WASH. POST, Feb. 13,
1994, at C1 (arguing that (1) ethnic tensions in the Balkans are overstated, e.g., 25% of the
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the United Nations created an International Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugo-
slavia since 1991.2 Unfortunately, however, the continued fighting in
the former Yugoslavia will make bringing war criminals to justice a
daunting task.3 Because the Tribunal will not try criminals in absen-
tia,4 it must arrange for the extradition of alleged criminals from a
region fraught with hostilities. 5 Many of the accused whom the Tribu-
nal desires to prosecute will fall within the ranks of the victors. 6 Eth-
nic groups currently fighting may also seek amnesty from the Tribunal
in exchange for a cease fire. 7 In many cases, the Tribunal will be hard
pressed to produce witnesses; some will have fled the ongoing hostili-
ties, some will have been killed, and some will be scared or reluctant
to testify.8 Likewise, relevant physical evidence will have been de-
stroyed or lost.9 Along with these difficulties and a host of other chal-
lenges, the Tribunal must protect witnesses from retribution at home
and from unnecessary collateral trauma caused by the stress of
testifying.10
marriages in the former Yugoslavia are "mixed" and (2) casting the conflict in ethnic terms
conveniently simplifies the situation for Western countries); Judy Mann, A Different Voice
at the Table, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 1993 (examining the conflict in terms of class, urban
versus rural conflicts, and general misogyny).
2. Hereinafter referred to as the "Tribunal." S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) [hereinafter Resolution 827]; S.C. Res. 808, U.N.
SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) [hereinafter Resolution 808];
Tragedy Continues with No Sign of Abatement, UN CHRON., Sept. 1993, at 13 (Resolution
827: Tribunal Created).
3. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1402 (difficult to "remove leaders of a sovereign state");
Abner Katzman, War Crimes Tribunal Convenes, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 1993, at A16.
4. Resolution 827, supra note 2, art. 21(d) (forbidding trial in absentia); Aryeh Neier,
Judgment in Sarajevo? For Serbs' Victims, A War Crimes Tribunal Is the Last Hope, WASH.
POST, Apr. 18, 1993, at C3 (trial in absentia is unfair to the defendants and would be an
error on the part of the Tribunal).
5. Currently, there are no indications that hostilities will end anytime soon. Military
Reports; Unprofor Mediator Proposes Temporary Ceasefire at Airport Talks, BBC SUM-
MARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 29, 1994, at EE/2139/C, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary; Sarajevo Radio Reports, Serb Attacks on Brcko and Sarajevo Reported, BBC
SUMMARY WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 29, 1994, at EE/2139/C, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library.
6. Neier, supra note 4, at C3 ("Architects of ethnic cleansing ... have been winning
the war."); see generally Pearl, supra note 1.
7. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1403.
8. Id. at 1405.
9. Id. at 1406.
10. Women in the Law Project of the International Human Rights Law Group, No
Justice, No Peace: Accountability for Rape and Gender Based Violence in the Former Yugo-
slavia, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 105 (1993) [hereinafter No Justice, No Peace]; Jen-
nifer Green et al., Affecting the Rules for the Prosecution of Rape and Other Gender-Based
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A witness's involvement with the Tribunal should not amount to
a second round of victimization as the witness "runs the gauntlet" of
reliving a painful experience by testifying before an indifferent bu-
reaucracy, an assaultive defense team, or an unsympathetic media.
The extent to which testifying before the Tribunal will be an ordeal
will depend largely upon the rules of procedure and evidence that the
Tribunal recently drafted to govern its operations." These rules, by
their own terms, came into force on March 14, 1994.12
Focusing specifically on protecting victims of gender crimes, this
Note explores some of the options that the Tribunal had when it
drafted its rules of procedure and evidence. Where the rules could be
more deferential to the needs of gender crime victims, particularly fe-
male rape victims, who testify before the Tribunal, this Note recom-
mends modifications or interpretations to help these victims.
Part I of this Note sets out the history of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia and describes the horrors of war crimes being committed
therein. Part ll.A examines the creation of the Tribunal. Part II.B
argues that the Tribunal's charter statute contains several viable paths
to the successful prosecution of rapists and concludes that the Tribu-
nal will, indeed, prosecute rape. Part II.C contends that protecting
victims, especially gender crime victims, who serve as witnesses andminimizing the trauma of testifying should be a top priority for the
Tribunal.
Because minimizing the trauma experienced by witnesses may be
accomplished by restricting cross-examinations, Part III.A examines
the confrontation rights of defendants and concludes that those rights
can be limited to shield witnesses from unduly hostile and trauma-
tizing questions. Part IU.B surveys the rules currently governing de-
fendants' confrontation rights before the Tribunal in light of the
conclusions drawn in Part III.A and recommends modifications to
better protect victims. Part LI.C examines the Tribunal's Victims and
Witnesses Unit and suggests how the Unit can ease the difficulties as-
sociated with testifying so as not to implicate confrontation rights.
Unfortunately, the suggestions in Part III, even if followed, will
not solve all the problems facing the Tribunal as it struggles to protect
witnesses while prosecuting criminals. Hopefully, however, these sug-
gestions will provide some useful guidance throughout the difficult
prosecutions ahead.
Violence Before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Feminist
Proposal and Critique, 5 HASTmnS WOMEN's L.J. 171, 171 (1994) [hereinafter Proposals].
11. International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Vi-
olations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Mar. 14,
1994), reprinted in 33 LL.M. 484 (1994) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
12. Id. at 484.
March 1995] RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
ff. The Situation in the Former Yugoslavia 13
A. Brief Overview of the Conflict
From the end of World War II until 1980, Yugoslavia was organ-
ized as a communist regime under Marshal Tito.14 Although the six
republics and two provinces that then formed the Federative People's
Republic of Yugoslavia had a long history of ethnic tensions, Tito's
rule was strong enough to keep the nation together.15 Before his
death in 1980, Tito organized a collective presidency to replace him. 16
Each republic or province was to provide one representative to the
collective presidency. 17 Tito hoped that this government would stay
ethnic tensions and keep the nation, as he knew it, united.'8 Unfortu-
nately, the republics soon began to vie for more sovereign powers, and
the central government began to decline.19 In 1990 communist leaders
in three republics (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina) werejettisoned, and staunch nationalists were elected to replace them.20
After electing its new nationalist government, Slovenia voted to se-
cede. 2' This led to civil war.22
When the war began, the Yugoslav army was controlled by
hardline communist Serbs, who quickly aligned themselves with the
Republic of Serbia.23 At the same time and with the backing of the
pro-Serb Yugoslav army, the Serb minority in Croatia began to divide
Croatia along ethnic lines.24 The Serb minority in Bosnia joined in
13. The former Yugoslavia consisted of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia,
Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two provinces (Kosovo and
Vojvodina). FACT BOOK 1991, supra note 1, at 343; BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 1, at
4.
14. In 1946 Yugoslavia became a "People's Republic" in the Soviet style. BACK-
GROUND NOTES, supra note 1, at 3.
15. Richard Cohen, Considering an Air Strike, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1993, at A27 (af-
ter Tito died, ethnic tensions resurfaced).
16. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1381 n.47 (citing ALEX DRAGNICH, SERBS & CROATS 137
(1992)).
17. BACKGROUND NOTES, supra note 1, at 4.
18. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1381 n.47.
19. Opposition parties sprang up throughout the country. By 1991 there were approx-
imately 100 opposition parties in Yugoslavia. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL REPORT 1991, at 252 (1991).
20. Human Rights Watch describes nationalism as the "linchpin" of the new govern-
ments which have emerged since Yugoslavia's demise. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD
REPORTER (1992) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].
21. Slovenia and Croatia voted for independence on June 25, 1992. Macedonia did
the same on September 8, 1992, and Bosnia-Hercegovina voted for independence that Oc-
tober. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 601.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 601, 603; CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK 1992,
at 43 (1992) [hereinafter FACT BOOK 1992].
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attacking Croatia, and the conflict quickly spilled over into Bosnia. 5
When Western Europe recognized Bosnia-Hercegovina's indepen-
dence in 1992, it only served to escalate the conflict.2 6 Against the
threat of the Yugoslav army and the Serb minorities, the Bosnian gov-
ernment and the Croatians formed a nominal alliance.27 At present,
the conflict continues; however, most commentators believe that the
Serbs are the clear victors. 8
B. "Ethnic Cleansing" and Rape
The most notorious aspect of the continued fighting in the former
Yugoslavia has been the parade of horribles euphemistically labeled
"ethnic cleansing.' 29 The term "ethnic cleansing" refers primarily to
the actions of Serbs in northwest Bosnia-Hercegovina.30 These Serbs
are cutting a broad path across Bosnia as they attempt to reunite with
Serbia to the east and are "cleansing" Bosnia of non-Serbs as they
advance.3 1 Although Bosnia has borne the worst of Serb aggression,
Croatia has also suffered at the hands of Serbs, and all sides of the
conflagration have been cited for repeated human rights violations.32
Even the Croatians and the Bosnian Muslims, groups supposedly
joined together in the fight against the Serbs, have attacked and bru-
talized one another.33
The magnitude of the atrocities falling under the rubric of "ethnic
cleansing" is mind-numbing. Observers have estimated that as many
as 250,000 Bosnian civilians, mostly Muslims and some Croats, have
been killed or are missing, although the ongoing hostilities and chaos
25. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 606 (describing the destabilizing influ-
ence of ethnic clashes in Bosnia).
26. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1382.
27. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 94 ("In April of 1993, for example, brutal
violence erupted between Muslims and Croatians, nominal allies against Serb forces, in
Central Bosnia.").
28. The conflict appears hard to resolve. By 1992, for example, the European Com-
munity had negotiated 13 cease fires, all of which failed to create a lasting peace. HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 606; Pearl, supra note 1, at 1383.
29. HuMAN RIGrrs WATCH, supra note 20, at 602; Andrew BellFialkoff, A Brief His-
tory of Ethnic Cleansing, FOmEiGN A'i., Summer 1993, at 110.
30. The Human Rights Watch states unequivocally that the Serbs are the worst of-
fenders against human rights, noting that Serbs have been responsible for thousands of
civilian deaths by summary execution. Id.; Katzman, supra note 3, at Al ("Although all
sides have committed atrocities in the Bosnian conflict, the Serbs have been blamed for
most of the mass rapes and murders, tortures and uprooting of populations in their quest to
purge Muslims from Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia.").
31. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1375.
32. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 93-94.
33. Id. at 94.
March 1995]
preclude a truly accurate count.34 Two million or more have been
forced to flee.35 Of those who have perished, many were killed in
summary executions, while others were rounded up and forced into
Serb-run "detention camps."'36 In these camps, "detainees" are rou-
tinely tortured, starved, and executed.37 Croats run similar camps.38
Serb military and paramilitary groups have also looted homes and
burned villages. 39 Cultural monuments have been targets, and Mus-
lims have been forced to cross themselves or otherwise violate the
tenets of their religion. 40 Food and medical supply shipments have
been interrupted, and hospitals have been deliberately attacked. 41
Rape has been widely used as a tool of ethnic cleansing.42 While wo-
men of all ethnic backgrounds have been raped by opposing soldiers,
rapes of Muslims by Serbs are most frequently reported.43 Although
less commonly cited, men have also been subject to sexual violence.44
For example, Muslim men have been forced to mutilate each others'
genitals.45
As a weapon of ethnic cleansing, rape is particularly effective for
several reasons. First, it humiliates both the individual victims and the
34. FACT BOOK 1991, supra note 1, at 43 (noting that Muslims are being forced out of
Bosnia). Recent estimates put the number dead or missing at 200,000 or a quarter million.
Denitch, supra note 1, at Cl; Lee Michael Katz, October Deadline for Serbs, USA TODAY,
Aug. 12, 1994, at A12.
35. Katzman, supra note 3, at Al; Denitch, supra note 1, at Cl (2 million of the for-
mer Yugoslavia's 4.5 million citizens have become refugees).
36. HUMAN RiGHTs WATCH, supra note 20, at 604 (summary executions); No Justice,
No Peace, supra note 10, at 94.
37. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 94.
38. Steven Engelberg & Chuck Sudetic, Conflict in the Balkans: In Enemy Hands,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1992, at Al (explaining that "Croats and Muslims are, to a lesser
extent, setting up their own prison camps").
39. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 605 (entire villages burned, churches
strafed); No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 94 (looting and burning).
40. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20, at 604 (cultural monuments destroyed);
No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 94 (cultural monuments destroyed).
41. Additionally, haphazard use of land mines has discouraged or disabled humanita-
rian missions organized by foreign governments. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 20,
at 604, 605.
42. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 94-95; Maass, supra note 1 (the Bosnian
government estimates that 30,000 women and girls have been raped, some as young as 12
years old); Roy Gutman, Rape Camps; Evidence Leaders in Bosnia OK'd Attacks, NEWS-
DAY (N.Y.), Apr. 19, 1993, at 5 (20,000 to 50,000 incidents of rape).
43. For the Record, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1993, at A4 (quoting Margaret Larson, as she
interviewed Radovan Karadzik, leader of the Bosnian Serbs: "The European Community
has confirmed that there are 20,000 Muslim women who have been raped by Serbian forces
as part of military strategy.").
44. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 95; Louise Branson, New Balkan Horror:
The Rape of Men, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 1, 1993, at A7.
45. Branson, supra note 44.
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communities in which they live.46 This is especially true in the former
Yugoslavia, where the stigma attached to rape is even greater than in
most Western cultures.47 For example, mass rapes by Serbs demoral-
ize the non-Serb population, thereby potentially weakening resistance
to Serb onslaught. Further, many non-Serbs flee rather than face the
specter of rape, which furthers the Serb goal of creating an ethnically
homogeneous corridor between Serbia and northwest Bosnia 8 One
strategy used to force non-Serbs to flee is to have paramilitary groups
enter a village and publicly rape several women.4 9 When the Yugoslav
army comes through several days later, the army offers the non-Serb
populace a chance to leave.:50 Many accept the "offer" rather than
risk further gender violence against themselves or their loved ones.5 1
Additionally, rapes are sometimes coupled with forced pregnancy-
raped women are detained until abortion is no longer legal or
feasible.5 2
H. The Tribunal
A. Creation of the Tribunal
The initial response of the United Nations-and most of the
world-to the horrors in the former Yugoslavia was to condemn un-
equivocally the commission of all atrocities.5 3 Shortly thereafter, the
Security Council resolved that a Commission of Experts should be es-
tablished to investigate the situation in the former Yugoslavia and to
"provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence
of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of
international humanitarian law."5 4
In February 1993 the Security Council passed Resolution 808,
which reaffirmed the Counsel's commitment to discouraging war
46. Maass, supra note 1 (the Bosnian government has accused the Serbs of using rape
to (1) increase troop morale and (2) humiliate women and their families).
47. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 108 & n.38; Laurel Fletcher et al., Human
Rights Violations Against Women, 15 WHrrTMR L. REv. 319, 321.
48. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 95.
49. Tadeusz Mazowieki, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of
the Former Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/48/92-5/25341, at 72 (1993).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Fletcher, supra note 47, at 321; Mazowieki, supra note 49, at 70-71. There have
also been reports of forced prostitution. Roy Gutman, U.N. Forces Accused of Using Serb-
Run Brothel, WAsH. PosT, Nov. 2, 1993, at A12.
53. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1375 & n.7; S.C. Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th
mtg. at 25, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992).
54. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3119th mtg. at 36, U.N. Doc. S/INF/48
(1992).
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crimes in the former Yugoslavia. 55 Resolution 808 also "upped the
ante" by providing for the creation of a war crimes tribunal aimed at
punishing violators of international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia.5 6 Specifically, Resolution 808 requested that the Secre-
tary-General prepare a report on all aspects of the tribunal, and the
Secretary-General was encouraged to make specific proposals on the
formation of the new tribunal.57 On May 3, 1993, the Secretary-Gen-
eral released his report, which delineated a potential charter statute
("the statute") for the tribunal, consisting of 34 articles.5 8 The report
briefly defended each article.59 In Resolution 827, the Secretary-Gen-
eral's recommendations were endorsed, and the International Tribu-
nal was created.60
B. Prosecution of Rape61
The Tribunal's official function is "the prosecution of persons re-
sponsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991."62
Specifically, the Tribunal is authorized to penalize grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of
war, genocide, and crimes against humanity, under Articles Two
through Five of the Tribunal's Charter, respectively.63 Given this defi-
nition of the Tribunal's role, prosecution of rape is mandated, as the
rapes occurring in the former Yugoslavia violate international law on
several levels. 64
Article Three of the Tribunal's Charter, for example, allows pros-
ecution for violations of customs or laws of war.65 This provides an
adequate basis for the prosecution of rape. History arguably estab-
lishes a custom criminalizing rape.66 For example, rape has been pro-
55. Resolution 808, supra note 2 (expressing the Security Council's alarm over "ethnic
cleansing").
56. Id. para. 1.
57. Id. para. 2.
58. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Reso-
lution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163
(1993) [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report].
59. Id.
60. Resolution 827, supra note 2, paras. 1-2.
61. See generally NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
STATUS OF WOMEN (1983) (discussing international agreements that affect the rights of
women).
62. Resolution 808, supra note 2, para. 1.
63. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 58, Annex, arts. II-V.
64. Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM.
J. INT'L. L. 424 (1993).
65. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 58, Annex, art. III.
66. Meron, supra note 64, at 427 n.22 & 23; Letter from Jordan Paust, 88 AM. J. INT'L
L. 88 (1994).
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hibited in military codes ranging from "those of Richard 11 (1385) and
Henry V (1419)" to the United States War Department's general or-
ders.67 Additionally, in the wake of World War II, rape was prose-
cuted as a war crime in the Tokyo Tribunal and was listed as a crime
against humanity in Control Council Law No. 10 by the allied powers
occupying Germany.68 Even if history is inadequate, the consensus of
modem governments and theorists indicates that rape is properly
viewed as a war crime.69
Article Two, which allows for the prosecution of "persons com-
mitting or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions," does not explicitly mention rape.7o While making rape
expressly verboten, the Geneva Conventions did not list rape as a
"grave breach. 71 Nevertheless, torture, inhuman treatment, and the
infliction of great suffering or serious injury to body or health are all
grave breaches mentioned in Article Two. 2 Thus, despite the con-
ceivable textual problem of having rape listed elsewhere in the Ge-
neva Convention, the definition of grave breaches seems broad
enough to sweep rape within its ambit. Indeed, the International Red
Cross has made that argument: all rape qualifies as willfully causing
serious injury to health and thus is a grave breach.73 One writer has
advanced this argument by asserting that "if so, surely rape-in cer-
tain circumstances-can also rise to the level of such other grave
breaches as torture or inhuman treatment." 74 This argument seems
especially forceful when rape is accompanied by forced pregnancy or
forced maternity.
Furthermore, to the extent that rape is being used as a tool of
ethnic cleansing (that is, to eliminate a given racial or religious group),
rape is properly addressed under Article Four, which covers geno-
67. Meron, supra note 64, at 425.
68. Id. at 426 n.14; Allied Control Council Law No. 10, art. II, § 1(c) (Dec. 20, 1945),
reprinted in 15 TRIALs FOR WAR CRIM wAs BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBU-
NALS UNDER CONTROL CouNciL LAW No. 10, at 23, 24-25 (1949) (originally in Control
Counsel for Germany, OFFICIAL GAZET E, Jan. 31, 1946) [hereinafter Control Council
Law No. 10].
69. Proposals, supra note 10, at 189; Meron, supra note 64, at 427 n.22 (quoting a Jan.
27, 1993 letter from Robert A. Bradtke, Acting Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs
to Senator Arlen Spector, which stated that the U.S. Department of State believes "the
legal basis for prosecuting troops for rape is well established under ... customary interna-
tional law").
70. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 58, Annex 1, art. II.
71. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tune of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 27, 147, 6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287, 306 & 388 (protecting women
against rape and defining "grave breaches," respectively).
72. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 58, Annex, art. II (listing grave breaches in
art. 147 as crimes for which the Tribunal can prosecute).
73. International Committee of the Red Cross, Aide Memoir (Dec. 1992).
74. Meron, supra note 64, at 425.
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cide.75 This argument is defensible where evidence exists to support
the proposition that forced pregnancy and maternity are intended to
"dilute" minority group bloodlines and to increase the number of
part-Serb babies born in Bosnia.
Most significantly, Article Five, listing crimes against humanity,
specifically includes rape. 76 As a practical matter, Article Five may
not provide the easiest means to prosecute rape because, by defini-
tion, crimes against humanity, unlike war crimes, must be "directed
against any civilian population. '77 This would generally require the
prosecutor to demonstrate some amount of organized state planning
of mass rapes, which is a comparatively difficult process. 78 However,
the explicit mention of rape highlights some important points: the Se-
curity Council has repeatedly condemned gender crimes, especially
rape, in the former Yugoslavia; the Secretary-General's report defers
to the needs of rape victims; and numerous countries commenting on
the Tribunal's Charter advocate treating rape as a crime against hu-
manity. Against this background, it seems likely that the Tribunal will
prosecute rapists and those who encouraged or allowed the use of
rape as a weapon of "ethnic cleansing."
C. The Importance of Having Rules of Procedure and
Evidence that Will Protect Victims who Testify
Specifically in the prosecution of rape, but more generally in all
prosecutions before the Tribunal, it is important that rules of evidence
and procedure protect victims who testify. The importance of protect-
ing victims and witnesses was not unknown to Security Counsel mem-
bers who ratified the Tribunal's governing statute, which stresses the
importance of protecting such victims to the framers of the Tribunal's
rules of procedure and evidence.
That is, the rules of procedure and evidence that went into force
on March 14, 1994 were authorized pursuant to Article 15 of the stat-
75. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 58, Annex, art. IV; Proposals, supra note
10, at 188 & n.64 (buttressing the argument that ethnic cleansing may be viewed as geno-
cide by pointing to an International Court of Justice decision that warns Yugoslavia to
avoid committing genocide, thereby implying official sanction to the argument that geno-
cide is occurring). For more background, see Elizabeth A. Kohn, Rape as a Weapon of
War: Women's Human Rights During the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.
L. REv. 199 at 207 (1994) (rape should be thought of as fostering genocide because of the
serious harm it causes Bosnian victims and because it is intended to destroy Muslim culture
and society); Beverly Allen, Unspeakable: When Rape Becomes a Weapon of Genocide,
Hous. CHRON., Apr. 4, 1993, at 5.
76. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 58, Annex, art. V.
77. Meron, supra note 64, at 428 & n.27.
78. Id. at 428 ("Crimes against humanity are therefore more difficult to establish";
gathering evidence of "policy planning, mass character and command responsibility" is a
significant hurdle).
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ute creating the Hague Tribunal. Article 15 provides a plenary grant
of authority to the Tribunal's judges to write rules of procedure and
evidence for the Tribunal and explicitly mentions the protection of
victims and witnesses:
The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of proce-
dure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the pro-
ceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the
protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters.79
Moreover, Article 22 of the Tribunal's statute provides specific in-
structions to the judges to consider the protection of victims and wit-
nesses when creating the Tribunal's rules:
The International Tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure
and evidence for the protection of victims and witnesses. Such pro-
tection measures shall include, but shall not be limited to, the con-
duct of in camera proceedings and the protection of the victim's
identity.8 0
In justifying Article 22, the Secretary-General pointed out that the
protections were needed "in light of the particular nature of the
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia." 81 Further, the Secre-
tary-General's report stated that the protections would be of the ut-
most importance in cases of "rape or sexual assault." s
The emphasis in both the Secretary-General's report and the Tri-
bunal's authorizing statute on the protection of witnesses and victims
is not undue. In fact, when creating rules of procedure and evidence,
the importance of protecting victims of war crimes who volunteer to
be witnesses for the Tribunal cannot be overstated. From a humanita-
rian perspective, the need is obvious. The Tribunal was created to
ameliorate suffering and rectify injustice, not to perpetuate the
same.
83
Thus, the Tribunal should strive to minimize the psychological
trauma associated with testifying. The formality of the court, the ag-
gressive nature of an adversarial cross-examination, the focus of atten-
tion on the witness within the courtroom, the extrajudicial media
publicity, the unfamiliar surroundings, and a host of other factors, if
permitted, can make the courtroom a hostile environment in which it
is extremely difficult for the most hardy witness to relive and describe
79. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 58, Annex, art. 21 (emphasis added).
80. ld. Annex, art. 22.
81. lId para. 108.
82. IL
83. See generally Resolution 827, supra note 2; Resolution 808, supra note 2.
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a painful experience. 84 Minimizing this difficulty is extremely impor-
tant in the case of rape victims.
Unfortunately, those who will attempt to prosecute military lead-
ers for war crimes and human rights violations will face numerous ob-
stacles, some of which are notably magnified in the case of rape.85
Acquiring sufficient evidence to successfully prosecute is one of the
most formidable obstacles; because of the fighting, witnesses are gen-
erally scattered and the perpetrators control any documentation of
military abuses.86 In the case of rape, gathering evidence is even
harder because "rape survivors are overwhelmingly reluctant to talk
about their experience. '87 Observers note that because of the stig-
matic and traumatic nature of rape, only a few victims have come for-
ward with their stories.88 Silence may be a valuable coping
mechanism for those attempting to deal with rape, as speech may be
emotionally devastating.89 Additionally, those who do speak may face
retribution not only from the rapists, but from their families as well,
particularly their husbands.90
Luckily, the psychological need for some victims to remain silent
is not always indefinite.91 At some point, a victim's need to regain
power and control in her life and community may become more im-
portant than the need to avoid directly confronting her ordeal.92 At
this point, the Tribunal can be a valuable vehicle through which wo-
men can empower themselves by taking affirmative steps to help pros-
ecute their assailants, thereby restoring moral and political order to
their communities.93 Rules of procedure should respect individual
witnesses' needs. Zeal to prosecute should not overshadow the need
to protect the actual and potential witnesses from the stresses of the
legal process. Thus, the goal of minimizing the trauma of the testify-
ing witnesses should be pursued when it can be done without compro-
mising the rights of the defendants.
In pursuing this goal, the Tribunal has more to gain than humani-
tarian benefits for its witnesses. The most immediately apparent col-
lateral benefit of protecting witnesses is the ability to attract more
84. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 109-10; Lisa H. Thielmeyer, Note, Beyond
Maryland v. Craig: Can and Should Adult Rape Victims be Permitted to Testify on Closed-
Circuit Television?, 67 IND. L.J. 797, 811 (1992).
85. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1405; No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 121.
86. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1406 (Serbs have in fact seized relevant paperwork);
Fletcher, supra note 47, at 12, 44 (describing the refugee crisis).
87. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 102.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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witnesses in the future.94 If testifying before the Tribunal results in
extreme psychological trauma, the Tribunal may quickly find its work
dampened by a lack of victim cooperation.95
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the Tribunal in the eyes of the
world, including the former Yugoslavia, will turn in part on the Tribu-
nal's ability to protect its witnesses. Three justifications have tradi-
tionally been advanced for the existence of international war crimes
tribunals-"morality, education, and solidarity with those who are suf-
fering." 96 The failure to protect witnesses from unnecessary trauma
while testifying would significantly undercut these justifications and
the Tribunal's legitimacy. To allow Tribunal proponents to argue that
its existence is legitimated by a moral mandate, the Tribunal must
maintain a position on the "moral high ground." Therefore, the Tri-
bunal should distinguish itself from those it convicts; one obvious way
to do that is to protect the innocent. Likewise, for the Tribunal's
records to educate the world about the evils that flourished in the for-
mer Yugoslavia, thereby encouraging universal self-improvement, the
records should show that improvement is feasible. If the Tribunal's
records are marred with the pain of its witnesses, the lesson of pro-
moting action to end crimes against humanity is diminished. Finally,
solidarity with those who are suffering would allow the Tribunal to
align itself with those who are suffering. At the least, the Tribunal can
write its own rules to benefit those suffering. Ideally, the Tribunal
should set a bold example of proper treatment of the disenfranchised
by protecting all witnesses.
The Tribunal's legitimacy in the eyes of the world is important for
several reasons. Within the former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal must be
taken seriously if it is to have a maximum deterrent effect against fu-
ture war crimes. To the extent that the Tribunal is viewed as illegiti-
mate and can be thwarted by intimidating witnesses with hostile cross-
examinations or by any other means, the Tribunal loses its power to
deter future breaches of international law. Furthermore, one of the
explanations for the level of violence and barbarity in Yugoslavia to-
day is that incidents of ethnic violence that occurred before Tito's rule
were never punished or addressed under Tito's regime and current
attempts to avenge these past incidents of violence have led to vicious
spirals of retribution and counter-retribution.97 In order to achieve
94. Thielmeyer, supra note 84, at 811 (pointing out that rape is underreported in this
country because victims fear the legal system, especially aggressive cross-examination); No
Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 103 (victims are likewise deterred by threats of retribu-
tion from offenders and relatives).
95. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 103.
96. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1408.
97. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 100-01 (quoting Roger Cohen, A Draw-
back to Serb Sanctions: They Don't Work, N.Y. TiwMs, Mar. 27,1993, § 1, at 4, to the effect
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long-term peace, the Tribunal must break from Tito's precedent and
provide a satisfactory answer to ethnic violations of human rights.
Only if the Tribunal is viewed as having legitimately addressed the
concerns of the victims of human rights law abuses will it be able to
quell desires for revenge and escalating attempts at extrajudicial "self
help."
Some commentators have pointed out that the Tribunal's exist-
ence may be a counterincentive to peace in the former Yugoslavia for
a variety of reasons.98 First, the violators of human rights, particularly
those who run detention camps, may be inspired to kill any eyewit-
nesses. 99 Second, Serb desire for complete conquest, rather than com-
promise, may be fostered by the perception that only losers are
convicted of war crimes. 100 Third, having the international community
condemn leaders in the former Yugoslavia may disgrace those leaders
and lead to coups or other political difficulties in their respective na-
tion-states. l01 Fourth, the Tribunal may strain relations between na-
tion-states in the former Yugoslavia and United Nations member
states, resulting in isolation and a denial of the potentially stabilizing
influence of membership in the world community. 0 2 Finally, violators
of international law may demand amnesty from the Tribunal before
agreeing to a truce.103
Not all of these arguments are necessarily meritorious and cer-
tainly there are counterarguments in favor of the Tribunal, some of
which are articulated in this Note. Regardless of any dangers, how-
ever, the Tribunal exists, and cases are likely to be tried soon. 1°4
Given the establishment of the Tribunal, the potential dangers the Tri-
bunal poses to peace in the former Yugoslavia indicate that the Tribu-
nal must make every effort to strive for legitimacy. If the Tribunal is
going to overcome these difficulties and play an important role in last-
ing peace in the former Yugoslavia, the Tribunal must be regarded
seriously in the former Yugoslavia and throughout the world. In fact,
as the first international war crimes tribunal in more than 40 years, the
Hague Tribunal has significant precedential value; its success or fail-
ure may determine whether the world, or at least the UN, is likely to
that nationalism was never addressed, only repressed, under Tito, so it has now
resurfaced).
98. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1399-1403 (concluding nonetheless that a War Crimes Tri-
bunal is a "necessary step").
99. Id. at 1403.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1402.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1403.
104. Steve Coil, In the Shadow of the Holocaust, WASH. PoST MAG., Sept. 25, 1994, at
W8 (the Tribunal's first indictments are expected at the end of November 1994, and four
people are currently awaiting trial in Western jails).
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undertake similar efforts in the immediate future.105 If the Tribunal is
a paper tiger, it may well do more harm than good.
H. Shielding Witnesses from the Trauma of Testifying
A. The Right of Confrontation
The goal of protecting witnesses from the trauma of hostile cross-
examination can be pursued only so far as cross-examination can be
limited. Whether cross-examination can be limited in whole or in part
depends on the confrontation rights of a defendant before the Tribu-
nal. Thus, before examining the protective nature of the rules the Tri-
bunal has written to govern its operation, a defendant's confrontation
rights before the Tribunal must be ascertained. That is, the Tribunal's
discretion to write rules to protect its witnesses is not unfettered.
First, the statute that creates the Tribunal is a valid exercise of the
Security Council's authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter.10 6 As such, the statute has the implicit consent of the 185
United Nations member states and is binding upon the Tribunal under
conventional international law.'0 7 This conclusion is in accord with
mainstream principles of prudence in constitutional interpretation: a
court should be bound by the instrument that creates it.
According to Article 21 of the statute (Rights of the Accused), an
accused is entitled to certain "minimum guarantees" including the
right "to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him."' 0 8
The proper interpretation of this right is not immediately apparent.
Are the rights of an accused satisfied under this provision if, for exam-
ple, a neutral fact finder examines a witness against the accused and
prepares a detailed report, admissible as evidence, for both sides?
Certainly, it is plausible to argue that having a neutral fact finder ex-
amine the witness adequately fulfills the "or have examined" language
in Article 21. On the other hand, this right may require something
more adversarial, and the "or have examined" language may refer to
the ability of counsel for the accused to interrogate the witness on the
defendant's behalf.
Article 21 also explicitly guarantees the accused a right to coun-
sel. Therefore, if the framers had intended to limit the defense's ex-amination to the accused or counsel for the accused, they hardly
needed to include the "or have examined" language. Eliminating the
105. Situation Worsens as Peace Process Continues, UN CHRON., June 1993, at 5 (not-
ing that the Tribunal is a first); Coil, supra note 104, at W8 (quoting Tribunal prosecutor
Richard Goldstone, who believes that the Tribunal's success or failure will be determina-
tive of whether similar forums are created in the future).
106. Secretary-General's Report, supra note 58, para. 22-31.
107. Id. para. 22-23.
108. Id. Annex, art. 21.
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"or have examined" language would not prevent counsel for the ac-
cused from cross-examining a witness on defendant's behalf, as the
right of defense counsel to conduct a cross-examination is implicit
upon granting the defendant a right to examination-any other con-
clusion would eviscerate the right to counsel. Unless the "or have ex-
amined" language is superfluous, there is a textual basis to interpret
this clause as allowing the right of examination to be fulfilled by some-
one other than the accused or the accused's counsel. One can buttress
the textual argument by noting that if the "or have examined" lan-
guage was intended merely for the purpose of extending power of ex-
amination to counsel, it is unnecessarily broad and ambiguous.
However, accepting this argument leads to numerous difficult ques-
tions about who, other than defendant and defendant's counsel, may
satisfy the examination right and under what circumstances.
Likewise, the statute does not make clear when a person qualifies
as a witness against the accused. Did the Article 21 framers intend to
allow defense examination of only live witnesses or should the defend-
ant be able to interrogate anyone who wishes to submit an affidavit?
If an expert testifies based on interviews with numerous victims,
should the defendant be able to examine those victims? Furthermore,
once the Tribunal has decided who falls within the scope of the ac-
cused's examination right, it remains unclear under what circum-
stances the examination must take place, what constitutes sufficient
examination, and whether the right should be modified if the witness
becomes unavailable after giving an affidavit or deposition.
When interpreting the right of confrontation under Article 21,
one logical starting point is legislative intent. The Secretary-General's
report, defending Article 21, states that "it is axiomatic that the Inter-
national Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized stan-
dards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its
proceedings."'109 Additionally, the Secretary-General explains that in
the interest of advancing such "internationally recognized standards,"
much of the language in Article 21 was borrowed directly from the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 110 In fact, the
accused's examination right as delineated in the Tribunal's statute is
taken verbatim from the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'11
Thus, the examination right could potentially be viewed through the
lens of the intent of those who drafted or ratified the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; however, the number of nations involved in
109. Id. para. 106.
110. Id.
111. Interestingly, the former Yugoslavia signed the optional protocol to this instru-
ment in March 1991. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
1991, at 252 (1991); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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producing the covenant, their divergent views, and varied legal sys-
tems would probably make any such attempt futile. Instead, Article
21 should be interpreted as congruent with "internationally recog-
nized standards regarding the rights of the accused."
This conclusion is appealing for several reasons. First, because
"internationally recognized standards" can be found in a broad variety
of easily surveyed international instruments and similar sources, this
conclusion provides a discernible paradigm for statutory interpreta-
tion. By expanding the focus of the investigation beyond the statute,
covenant, and amorphous legislative histories, the search for "interna-
tionally recognized standards" provides a comparatively ample supply
of normative gap fillers to be drawn from international consensus.
Further, to the extent that "internationally recognized standards"
mean customary international law or general principles of interna-
tional law, the Tribunal is bound by those standards.112 This has two
consequences. First, the search for those standards is mandated, as
the Tribunal must be aware of the laws governing its function. Addi-
tionally, any controversy over the relevance of legislative intent is
mooted because in so far as legislative intent is construed as a basic
desire to comport with international law, legislative intent has been
defined into obsolescence. Simply put, international law is binding re-
gardless of legislative intent.11 3 Nor is this view of legislative intent an
unnatural one, as it follows both the text of the Secretary-General's
report and a popular canon of construction which provides that, when-
ever possible, subsequent laws should be interpreted in accord with
those laws already in existence. 14
Therefore, the search for "internationally recognized standards"
should begin with a search for relevant custom or general principles
concerning the defendant's right to confrontation. Although there is
not universal agreement, most scholars believe that both custom and
general principles of international law operate at a fairly high level of
abstraction.115 Even at a high level of abstraction, custom and general
112. MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCrION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 3 (1988).
113. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions, 3
DuKE J. COMP. & INr'L L. 235, 237-38 (1993) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Human Rights]
(describing how protections of human rights rise from theory to binding law).
114. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATION LAW § 3(3)
(1965) (explaining that if "a domestic law of the United States may be interpreted either in
a manner consistent with international law or in conflict with international law," consis-
tency is preferred).
115. M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to "General Principles of Interna-
tional Law," 11 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 777 (1990) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Functional Approach]
(quoting a definition of "general principles" which indicates that such principles operate at
a high level of abstraction from 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS
OF HERSH LAUTERPACi-rr 69, 74 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1970)). Note that Bassiouni himself
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principles may potentially inform the rule-making process with re-
spect to such issues as whether the right to confrontation is absolute
or in what ways it may be compromised.
Under the classical definition, customary international law is law
"made over time by widespread practice of governments acting from a
sense of legal obligation.11 6 Thus, the first step in establishing a bind-
ing custom is to show that a practice is "both extensive and virtually
uniform. ' 117 When taking this step, it is permissible to look to a broad
range of evidence to discern consistent behavior among states. Trea-
ties, executive agreements, diplomatic correspondence, and digests on
the national practice of international law are all good sources.' 8 Un-
fortunately, in the area of human rights, there is often a difference
between what states demand of their peers and what those states actu-
ally practice at home." 9 This leads to confusion over whether custom
is best founded on internal or international practice. °20 For simplicity,
and not from a desire to take a stand in the internal versus interna-
tional debate, this Note will seek customs with primarily international
roots. Additionally, disagreement exists regarding when a practice is
sufficiently pervasive to rise to the level of custom.
The second step in demonstrating a custom requires proof that
the practice at issue is followed because of a "sense of legal obliga-
tion"-frequently referred to in Latin as opinio juris vel necessitatis.121
This step is difficult because a state's true motivations are not neces-
sarily revealed by looking at what that state tells the world; a govern-
ment must be motivated by a feeling of legal duty and not by a whim
or image.' 22
However, even absent the difficulties intrinsic to the process of
identifying a binding custom, it would be hard to show a custom for
the right of absolute adversarial confrontation. A logical place to be-
gin the investigation for uniform practice is with the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials, which were held in the wake of World War II. These
trials show the practices of the four major allied powers, which have
concludes that general principles can be very specific, if such principles are derived by
surveying correspondingly narrow provisions in relevant instruments. Bassiouni, Human
Rights, supra note 113, at 245.
116. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 33 (2d ed. 1979).
117. JANIS, supra note 112, at 39 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 4,
43).
118. This is a partial list of what the U.S. Department of State considers valid sources
of customary international law. Id. at 41.
119. Naomi Roht-Arriaza 84 (1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
120. Id.
121. JANIS, supra note 112, at 39-40 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 102(2) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1985)).
122. Id. at 40-41.
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since been endorsed by scholars and nations throughout the world.123
Of the various sources that might indicate universal practice, the Nu-
remberg and Tokyo trials present the closest parallels to the situation
at hand.
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
provided, in Part IV, for "Fair trial for defendants."'124 It read in rele-
vant section: "A defendant shall have the right through himself or his
Counsel to present evidence at the Trial in support of his defense, and
to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution."'125 Like the
current Hague Tribunal, the Nuremberg Tribunal had broad power to
"draw up rules for its procedure ... not... inconsistent with the
provisions of [the Tribunal's] charter."1 26 About three months after
its creation, the Nuremberg Tribunal published a simple set of 11 pro-
cedural rules. Although the rules discussed the right to compulsory
process at some length, they shed no additional light on the defend-
ant's confrontation right.127 Thus, while the above rule valued cross-
examination, it also limited the ability of defendants to cross-examine
those witnesses the prosecution chose to call. In fact, the Nuremberg
Tribunal exercised great evidentiary freedom and flexibility under its
charter, frequently permitting the admission of affidavits and thereby
denying the defense any opportunity for cross-examination.1 28
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East also had a section that provided for the fair trial of an accused.129
The confrontation clause therein read:
Evidence for the defense. An accused shall have the right, through
himself or through his counsel (but not through both), to conduct
his defense, including the right to examine any witness, subject to
such reasonable restrictions as the Tribunal may determine.' 30
The Tribunal for the Far East had the authority to draft rules of proce-
dure. However, these rules were sparse and did not address confron-
123. ARNA TuSA & JOHN TUSA, TiE NUREMBERG TRIAL (1984).
124. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis, IV, art. 16(a)-(e), reprinted in
ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE 21-29 (1947) [hereinafter Charter].
125. Id. at IV, art. 16(e).
126. Ild. at II, art. 13.
127. International Military Tribunal Rules of Procedure (1945), reprinted in 1 TRIAL OF
THE MAJOR WAR CRmIMNALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 19-23
(1947).
128. Charter, supra note 124, at V, art. 19; No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 198
n.110.
129. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
amended Apr. 26, 1946, at III, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 2613, TRIAL OF
JAPANESE WAR CRIMiNALs 39-44 (1946).
130. Id. at III, art. 9(d).
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tation rights.' 3 ' Again, therefore, the relevant language established a
practice of respecting a confrontation right, but not as an absolute
right immunized against all derogation.
In addition to the international tribunals that convened in Nu-
remberg and Tokyo, unilateral war crimes tribunals were formed by
each of the powers occupying Germany.' 32 These tribunals were au-
thorized, in Control Council Law No. 10, by the American, Russian,
French, and English governments and were administered by the Zone
Commanders governing postwar Germany on behalf of the allied
powers. 133 A brief survey of the procedures used by these tribunals
reveals that the prosecutors made ample use of affidavits in proving
their cases, although the defense was afforded opportunity to examine
any testifying witnesses.' 34 Examination of the national courts con-
vened by allied powers in Tokyo yields the same result.135
Of the international instruments surveyed for this Note, fourteen
have provisions dealing with some matters of criminal procedure, but
only two explicitly protect the defendant's right to confrontation. 36
131. Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, re-
printed in R. JOHN PRITCHARD & SONIA MAGBANAU ZAIDE, 1 THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES
TRIAL (1981).
132. Control Council Law No. 10, supra note 68 (authorizing zone commanders to
form tribunals and setting uniform standards for the prosecution of war criminals therein).
133. Id.
134. For example, the U.S. Military Tribunals were expressly permitted to admit affida-
vits and a list of other documentary evidence if the writings "appear[ed] ... to contain
information of probative value." Defendants were allowed to "cross-examine any witness
called by the prosecution." Military Government-Germany, U.S. Zone Ordinance No. 7,
arts. IV(e) & VII reprinted in 1 TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at XXIII (1949).
Likewise, the British made free use of affidavits. See generally TRIAL OF GOZAWA
SADAICHI AND NINE OTHERS (Colin Sleeman ed., 1948); THE PELIUS TRIAL, BRITISH MIL-
ITARY COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF WAR CRIMINALS HELD AT THE WAR CRIMES COURT,
HAMBERG (Oct. 17, 1945), reprinted in 1 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1 (1947).
135. Pearl, supra note 1, at 1393 (stating that there were 419 witnesses at the Tokyo
trials and 779 affidavits).
136. I surveyed the 57 instruments in Human Rights: A Compilation of International
Instruments, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/1/Rev.2, U.N. Sales No. E.83XIV.1 (1983).
Not all of the instruments touch on matters of criminal procedure. For example, the
instruments relating to discrimination affect criminal procedure only in so far as those in-
struments call for all law to be dispensed even-handedly. See generally Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/
180; Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, Nov. 27, 1978, UNESCO Doc. 20C/3/1.1/2;
Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Nov. 7, 1967, G.A. Res.
2263 (XXII); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrim-
ination, Dec. 21, 1965, G.A. Res. 2106 A (XX); United Nations Declaration on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Nov. 20, 1963, G.A. Res. 1904 (XVIII).
Most of the other instruments that dealt with issues of criminal procedure did so only
in a general sense, such as granting access to the courts or endorsing a due process ideal in
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These two are the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights, containing the same language as the Tribunal's statute, and the
American Convention on Human Rights, which is similarly worded.137
Based on this brief survey, it seems unlikely that the level of
universality prerequisite to a custom exists in the area of the right to
confrontation. Thus, it is not necessary to determine whether those
states that have adhered to the practice of honoring or encouraging a
confrontation right through their international affairs did so out of a
sense of legal obligation. Further, to the extent that the right has been
recognized in international fora, the right has been construed nar-
rowly and has never been construed to be absolute. 138 This survey
both highlights the acknowledgment of the examination right in sev-
eral important precedents and also stands for the proposition that the
examination right is subject to reasonable limits or a narrow reading.
Similarly, an analysis of the relevant sources leads to the conclu-
sion that no general principle of international law on point exists.
"The definition of a 'general principle of the law' has been a source of
considerable difficulty."'1 39 Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice contains the most widely accepted formula-
tion of the concept, referring to "the general principles of law
relevant judicial or administrative hearings. See generally Code of Conduct for Law En-
forcement Officials, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/169; Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners, July 31, 1957, ECS Res. 663 C (XXIV), 2076 (LXII); Convention
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, Sept. 28, 1954, ESC Res. 526 A (XVII); Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, G.A. Res. 429 (V); Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, G.A. Res. 260
A(M).
However, several instruments do make explicit procedural guarantees. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) (among other
guarantees, the confrontation right); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture or Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Dec. 9, 1975, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX) (victim's statement obtained by torture should
not be admissible to prove guilt at trial); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10,
1948, G.A. Res. 217 A (MI) (innocent until proven guilty, right to public trial); Proclama-
tion of Teheran, May 13, 1968, Int'l Conf. on Human Rts. at Teheran (1968) (affirming
generally the Universal Declaration and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights).
In addition to the instruments in the UN compilation, the American Convention on
Human Rights and the International Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms also contained relevant guarantees. The American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36 [hereinafter American Conven-
tion]; International Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 214 U.N.T.S. 221.
137. ICCPR, supra note 111, pt III, art. 14(c)(3); American Convention, supra note
136, pt. i, ch. II, art. 8(2)f.
138. But see Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Law of War, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 435 (1993)
(articulating the value placed on cross-examination in the United States).
139. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 119, at 101.
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recognized by civilized nations," as a valid source of binding interna-
tional law.' 40 Numerous authors have struggled to make this language
scrutable. 141 Most agree that all United Nations member states
should be considered "civilized" for the purpose of this inquiry. 142
Finding the general principles that these nations "recognize" is consid-
erably more difficult.' 43 The current wisdom tends to be "that a gen-
eral principle of law is some proposition of law so fundamental that it
will be found in virtually every legal system."' 44 Therefore, tech-
niques of comparative law are used and national instruments are
"overlapped" in the search for a common nucleus. 45
For the purposes of this Note, only constitutions were surveyed;
thus a conclusion contrary to my finding that no relevant general prin-
ciple exists could be reached if a survey of statutes and common law
throughout the "civilized" nations was completed. However, of the
180 constitutions surveyed, only 33 specifically guarantee a right to
confrontation, and most do so only in general terms.' 46 Of these con-
stitutions, 27 placed the right of confrontation or examination among
140. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c), as annexed to the Char-
ter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153 (signed in San Fran-
cisco June 26, 1945; entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).
141. Michael Akehurst, The Application of General Principles of Law by the Court of
Justice of the European Communities 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 29 (1981); Bassiouni, Func-
tional Approach, supra note 115; Lynn Berat, Human Rights Violators From a Predecessor
Regime, 13 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 199 (1993); Wolfgang Friedman, The Uses of "General
Principles" in the Development of International Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 279 (1963); Frances
T. Jalet, The Quest for General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations-A
Study, 10 UCLA L. Rnv. 1041 (1963).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. JANIS, supra note 112, at 47.
145. Id.
146. In conducting this survey, I am greatly indebted to Cherif Bassiouni, who paved a
broad path (which I then followed) in his article on international procedural protections.
Specifically, he examined the related right to compulsory process, but made little mention
of confrontation. Because compulsory process is generally enumerated with confrontation,
I was able to use his citations to locate quickly the confrontation or examination right
clauses in many nations' constitutions. Bassiouni, Human Rights, supra note 113, at 278-97.
Interestingly, these clauses were often identical. Typically, they read: "Every Person
who is charged with a criminal offense.., shall be afforded facilities to examine in person
or by his legal representative the witnesses called by the prosecution before any court .... "
ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, § 15(2)(e); BAH. CONST. ch. III, § 20(2)(e); BARB. CONST. ch.
III, § 18(2)(e); BELIZE CONST. ch. II, § 6(3)E; Boas. CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(e); DOMINICA
CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(e); Fui CONST. ch. II, § 11(2)(e); GAM. CONST. ch. III, § 20(2)(e);
GREN. CONST. ch. I, § 8(2)(e); Guy. CONST. Pt. II, tit. I, art. 144(2)(e); JAM. CONST. ch. III,
§ 20(6)(d); KENYA CONST. ch. V, § 77(2)(e); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(e); MALTA
CONST. ch. IV, § 39(6)(d); MAURrrIUS CONST. ch II, § 10(2)(e); NAURU CONST. pt. II,
§ 10(3)(f); NIG. CONST. ch. IV, § 33(6)(d); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. III(3)(B), § 37(4)(f); ST.
CHRIS-NEvis CONST. ch. II, § 10(2)(e); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III, § 23(5)(d); SOLOM.
IS. CONST. ch II, § 10(2)(e); SWAZ. CONST. ch II, § 10(2)(e); TUVALU CONST. pt. II,
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a cluster of rights that included a guarantee of "equality of arms."147
"Equality of arms" labels the idea that the prosecution and defense
should have equal tools at their disposal.148 "Equality of arms" can be
interpreted as containing an independent guarantee of defense cross-
examination when the prosecution is permitted to directly examine a
witness.
Equality of arms is a hallmark of the modem, more adversarial
process, as opposed to earlier inquisitorial systems.1 49 In his article on
international procedural protections, Cherif Bassiouni explains that
among the human rights instruments he surveyed, there was "a defi-
nite move towards adversarial procedures and away from the inquisi-
torial mode."' 50 Given this trend, it is not surprising that the right to
confrontation has not yet found its way into the majority of the consti-
tutions of "civilized" nations. To date, the trend does not appear to
have ripened into a general principle.
Because of the failure to establish a relevant custom or general
principle, those precedents favoring the examination right and those
that constrain the right (or allow exceptions to it) lack the force of
law. Nevertheless, those precedents are indicia of what composes "in-
ternationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the ac-
cused." Hence, they provide guidance for fulfilling the legislative
§§ 22(3)(f)(ii), 22(14)(b); UGANDA CONST. Ch. III, § 15(2)(e); ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III,
§ 18(2)(e); Zims. CONSr. ch. II, § 18(3)(e).
The constitutions that differed notably are listed below. JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 37
("He [the accused] shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses"); LIBER.
CONS?. ch. III, art. 21(h) ("[Tlhe accused shall have the right ... to confront the witnesses
against him"); MEx. Co Ns. tit. I, ch. I, art 20(IV) ("He shall be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him, who shall testify in his presence if they are to be found in the place
where the trial is held, so that he may cross-examine them in his defense"); NAMM. CONS?.
ch. I, art. 12(1)(d) ("All persons charged with an offence shall be presumed innocent
until proven guilty according to law, after having had the opportunity of calling witnesses
and cross-examining those called against them"); Prm. CONs?. art. IV, § 19 ("In all crimi-
nal prosecutions the accused shall ... enjoy the right.., to meet witnesses face to face");
U.S. CONs?. amend. VI.
147. Arr. & BARB. CONS?. ch. II, § 15(2)(e); BAli. CONST. ch. III, § 20(2)(e); BARB.
CONs?. ch. II, § 18(2)(e); BELizE CONSr. ch. H, § 6(3)E; Bors. CoNsr. ch. H, § 10(2)(e);
DOmrNCA CoNs?. ch. I, § 8(2)(e); FLu CoNs?. ch. II, § 11(2)(e); GAM. CONST. ch. III,
§ 20(2)(e); GREN. CONSr. ch. I, § 8(2)(e); Guy. CoNs?. pt. H, tit. I, art. 144(2)(e); JAM.
CONS?. ch. mI, § 20(6)(d); KENYA CONS?. ch. V, § 77(2)(e); KRBATI CoNs?. ch. H,
§ 10(2)(e); MALTA CONS?. ch. IV, § 39(6)(d); MA&uRsS CONS?. ch II, § 10(2)(e); NAURU
CONS?. pt. U1, § 10(3)(f); NIG. CONSr. ch. IV, § 33(6)(d); PAPuA N.G. CONsr. pt. III(3)(B),
§ 37(4)(f); ST. CHmRS-NEvis CoNs?. ch. II, § 10(2)(e); SmRRA LEONE CoNs?. ch. III,
§ 23(5)(d); SOLOM. Is. CONST. ch II, § 10(2)(e); SwAZ. CONST. Ch I1, § 10(2)(e); TuvALu
CONS?. pt. U1, §§ 22(3)(f)(ii), 22(14)(b); UGANDA CONS?. Ch. III, § 15(2)(e); ZAMBIA
CONS?. pt. 1II, § 18(2)(e); ZimB. CONS?. ch. If, § 18(3)(e).





intent behind the right as iterated in Article 21. Thus, these prece-
dents provide a prudent starting point for determining how to inter-
pret the right. Overall, the search for custom or general principle
reveals that the examination right is an important procedural safe-
guard for a fair adversarial process and should not be diminished for
trivial reasons. However, where principled reasons for construing the
right narrowly exist, the Tribunal's rules of procedure should reflect
such concerns. As a prudential matter, a desire to protect victims who
participate in the trial process provides an acceptable justification for
limiting the examination right.
B. Limiting the Cross-Examination Right
Simply concluding that the confrontation right can be derogated
to protect witnesses only begins the analysis. The next question is
how to balance the confrontation right against the needs of witnesses.
The difficulties in balancing stem from the fact that the Tribunal's le-
gitimacy will suffer if either victims and witnesses or defendants are
harmed.' 51 Unfortunately, maximizing shields for witnesses requires
cutting into the confrontation right.
The balance struck in the rules of procedure and evidence that
currently govern the Tribunal favors allowing adversarial cross-exami-
nation. For example, the rules generally require all witness testimony
to be presented live before the Tribunal.' 52 Further, any witness
before the Tribunal must present direct, cross, and re-direct testi-
mony.153 Only under unusual circumstances may the Tribunal allow
depositions in lieu of in-Tribunal testimony.' 54 Further, adversarial
cross-examination at depositions is mandated. 55
151. See supra Part II.C.
152. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 533-34. Rule 90-Testimony
of Witnesses states in relevant part:
(A) Witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the [Trial] Chambers. In
cases, however, where it is not possible to secure the presence of a witness, a
Chamber may order that the witness be heard by means of a deposition as pro-
vided for in Rule 71.
153. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 531. Rule 85-Presentation
of Evidence states in relevant part:
(A) Each party is entitled to call witnesses and present evidence. ...
(B) Examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination shall be allowed
in each case. It shall be for the party calling the witness to examine him in chief,
but the Judge may at any stage put any question to the witness.
154. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 524-25. Rule 71-Depositions
states in relevant part:
(A) At the request of either party, a Trial Chamber may, in exceptional circum-
stance and in the interests of justice, order that a deposition be taken for use at
trial, and appoint, for that purpose, a Presiding Officer.
155. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 524-25. Rule 71-Depositions
states in relevant part:
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On the other hand, the rules place some limits on cross-examina-
tion. The Tribunal's judges are instructed to prevent questions that
are intended to intimidate or harass.1 56 A closed circuit, one-way tele-
vision system may also be used to prevent witnesses from coming into
direct contact with the defense team and defendants who previously
harmed them.157 Additionally, in cases of sexual assault, examination
is limited by what is essentially a rape shield rule, which prevents the
introduction of prior sexual conduct evidence entirely, prevents the
use of consent as a defense, and dictates that evidence corroborating a
victim's testimony is not necessary to obtain a conviction.158
In sum, however, the balance currently favors cross-examination.
The Tribunal legitimately could have imposed greater limits on con-
frontation. 159 Testimony obtained ex parte-from one-sided deposi-
tions or from affidavits' 6 0-could have been allowed.' 6' However, the
framers of the Tribunal's rules apparently felt that adversarial cross-
examination was necessary-ostensibly to protect defendants and to
obtain meaningful convictions.
Such emphasis on allowing cross-examination reflects the modem
trend toward equality of arms: the principle that requires the defense
be afforded the same opportunities as the prosecution in presenting its
case. 62 Likewise, Tribunal-rules that restrict cross-examination stray
from the principle of equality of arms because such rules inevitably
disadvantage the defense. Notably, though, the Tribunal rules that do
restrict cross-examination preserve the heart of the exercise: truth
(E) The Presiding Officer shall insure that the deposition is taken in accordance
with the Rules and that a record is made of the deposition, including cross-exami-
nation and objections raised by either party for decision by the Trial Chamber.
He shall transmit the record to the Trial Chamber.
156. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 527. Part Six-Proceedings
Before the Trial Chambers: Rule 75-Protection of Victims and Witnesses states in rele-
vant part:
(C) A Chamber shall, whenever necessary, control the manner of questioning to
avoid any harassment or intimidation.
157. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 527. Rule 75-Protection of
Victims and Witnesses states in relevant part:
(B)(iii) appropriate measures to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims and
witnesses, such as one-way closed circuit television.
158. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 535-36 (Rule 96-Evidence in
Cases of Sexual Assault).
159. See supra Part Ill.A.
160. Proposals, supra note 10, at 200 ("Suggested Evidentiary Rules, Proposals, 4. Ef-
forts should be made to prove cases against the defendant with evidence other than the
direct testimony of the survivors of the atrocities").
161. Id.; See generally Thielmeyer, supra note 84.
162. Bassiouni, Human Rights, supra note 113, at 277.
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seeking.163 Further, Tribunal rules only restrict cross-examination
when doing so significantly benefits witnesses. Therefore, derogation
of equality of arms is minimized.
For example, the current rule forbidding questions that intimidate
or harass' 64 minimizes the damaging effects of cross-examination by
eliminating psychologically assaultive tactics. At the same time, that
rule does not interfere with the truth-seeking function of cross-exami-
nation, which is vital to the defense. Indeed, because harassment and
intimidation are often the foes of truth, the rule arguably increases the
value of cross-examination by the defendant. At the least, the rule
does not degrade the value of cross-examination much compared to
the lengths the rule goes toward minimizing the mentally damaging
aspects of being cross-examined.
The other rules limiting cross-examination before the Tribunal
appear to have been drafted in a similar spirit. For example, closed
circuit television' 65 does not blunt the truth-seeking process nor the
Tribunal's ability to glean the nonverbal evidence that is a benefit of
live testimony. At the same time, the electronic meeting is less threat-
ening for many witnesses.
Likewise, although cutting deeper into the confrontation right,
the rape shield rule 166 does not deviate from the principle of preserv-
ing the core functions of cross-examination. That is, the rape shield
rule does not undercut the truth-seeking process when it bans consent
defenses and prior sexual conduct evidence. But, nonetheless, the
rape shield rule minimizes the pain experienced by an extremely vul-
nerable class of witnesses.
The view that the rape shield rule leaves the truth-seeking pro-
cess unscathed makes several presumptions about the truth in cases of
sexual assault in the war-torn former Yugoslavia: namely, that a vic-
tim did not consent to any sexual contact and that prior sexual con-
duct-whether it be extreme promiscuity or total lack thereof-has
no bearing on whether a victim was sexually assaulted in the present
case. Both of these presumptions are defensible in the case of war
163. Finding a custom or general principle in international law for truth seeking as the
heart or key to any judicial process would be an interesting-and realistic-exercise for
another day. Notably, in the middle of the 19th century, Dr. Hans Gross, an Austrian man
often referred to as the "father of criminalistics" defined the "search for truth" as the goal
of all criminal investigations. JAMES MURPHY, THE POLYGRAPH TECHNIQUE, PAST AND
PRESENT (1980).
164. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 524-25 (Rule 71-Deposi-
tions); supra note 154.
165. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 524-25 (Rule 71-Deposi-
tions); supra note 155.
166. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 526 (Part Six-Proceedings
Before the Trial Chambers); supra note 156.
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crimes. These presumptions are especially defensible in the former
Yugoslavia, where ethnic hatreds and conservative social mores make
the chances of consensual sexual contact between defendants and wit-
nesses de minimis.167 Therefore, both the defense of "consent" and
evidence of prior sexual conduct are irrelevant. Thus, the rape shield
rule can be said to protect witnesses without undermining the heart of
the confrontation privilege.
By enacting protective rules-like the rape shield rule-that pre-
serve the truth-seeking function of defensive cross-examination, the
framers strike a balance between defendants' confrontation rights and
witnesses' psychological needs that respects the principle of equality
of arms. That in turn secures the Tribunal against the criticism that
trials before it are unfair to defendants, which is a valid goal. There-
fore, if Tribunal witnesses can be adequately protected without deviat-
ing from the goal of maintaining equality of arms, that goal should be
respected. On the other hand, if experience demonstrates that wit-
nesses are not adequately protected, the Tribunal should consider sac-
rificing some equality of arms, which is not yet mandated under
international law.
Regardless, certain additional protective limits on cross-examina-
tion could be allowed without compromising the defensive value of
cross-examination. Such limits on confrontation could provide addi-
tional protections that witnesses need and deserve, while offering a
superior alternative to entirely abandoning equality of arms. In fact,
the overall likelihood that the Tribunal will need to consider aban-
doning equality of arms could be decreased by such proactive meas-
ures. This Note suggests new restrictions 168 on confrontation that are
in keeping with the spirit of the limitations already imposed under the
Tribunal's rules. Hopefully, by implementing these suggestions, the
Tribunal can offer its witnesses enough protection so the Tribunal will
never need to consider sacrificing equality of arms.
One such suggestion that could greatly protect witnesses without
undermining truth seeking would be to allow live testimony before the
Tribunal to be videotaped and later readmitted against similarly situ-
167. Proposals, supra note 10, at 203.
168. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 496 (granting judges power to
amend rules). Rule 6-Amendment of Rules states in relevant part:
(A) Proposals for amendment of the Rules may be made by a Judge, the Prosecu-
tor or the Registrar and shall be adopted if agreed to by not less than seven
Judges at a plenary meeting of the Tribunal convened with notice of proposal
addressed to all Judges.
(B) An amendment of the rules may be otherwise adopted provided it is unani-
mously approved by the Judges.
(C) An amendment shall enter into force immediately, but shall not operate to
prejudice the rights of the accused in any pending case.
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ated defendants. 169 Defendants against whom previously recorded
testimony was admitted could pose additional, but not redundant,
questions to the witness who originally testified.170 From the view-
point of a key witness, admission of previously recorded testimony
would be far superior to undergoing multiple cross-examinations,
which would quickly become repetitive and draining. From the view-
point of the Tribunal's judges, who will be weighing the validity of the
testimony, videotape should be a fairly good approximation of live
testimony. Moreover, a tape captures fresh testimony, whereas multi-
ple cross-examinations will sometimes result in stale renditions of the
witness's original story and sometimes in a witness who is emotionally
exhausted and unable to continue.
Finally, from the viewpoint of the defendant, there are some rhe-
torical disadvantages to admission of prerecorded testimony because
the style, manner, order, and exact wording of questions would be
fixed. Substantively, however, the defendant would be largely unaf-
fected. The defendant would have a fair chance to ask new questions,
present a full story, and flush out important details. Therefore, truth
seeking would not be preempted.
Additionally, the Tribunal can reduce the number of witnesses
who are forced to testify before it through strategic use of expert wit-
nesses. For example, expert witnesses could be used to establish a
pattern of rape or gender crimes committed by troops associated with
particular military units, thus establishing command responsibility
without requiring the examination of hundreds of victims. 17 1
Defendants would have ample opportunity to question experts on
how conclusions were drawn. The Tribunal would gain the benefit of
expert advice in drawing important conclusions. Furthermore, Tribu-
nal resources could be conserved by efficient use of experts. If one
expert does all the fieldwork and analysis to reach a key conclusion,
the Tribunal is spared going through the same arduous process on an
amateur level. Moreover, expert witnesses are currently contem-
plated by the Tribunal. The Tribunal needs merely to decide to use
them in lieu of multiple lay witnesses whenever possible.
Finally, there are several things that the Tribunal could do to
make more effective its efforts to weed out harassing and intimidating
questions and to better enforce its rape shield rule. First, the Tribunal
could amend its rules to allow the judges to request lists of proposed
169. Anecdotal evidence indicates that many defendants will be similarly situated. For
example, in Serb-run camps, detained women have often been assaulted by numerous cap-
tors acting in tandem.
170. Proposals, supra note 10, at 209-10.
171. Id. at 200, 204; No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 105-06.
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questions prior to the examination of any witness.17 2 Thus, the Tribu-
nal's judges would have greater opportunity to screen out inappropri-
ate questions.
Second, counsel should not be required to adhere strictly to pre-
viously submitted questions, but rather should be allowed to impro-
vise questions based on new information learned during examination.
Thus, the Tribunal should amend its contempt rule to allow sanctions
against attorneys who persist in asking inappropriate questions. This
could chill adversarial cross-examination; however, if attorneys are
given ample warning that the questions they are posing are inappro-
priate, sanctions are reasonable.
C. Victims and Witnesses Unit
Curtailing cross-examination through the mechanisms discussed
in Part HLI.B, supra, is not the only means of minimizing the trauma
associated with being involved in the trial process as a witness and
victim. Another mechanism for protecting witnesses, which does not
implicate defendants' confrontation rights and is already in place, is
the Tribunal's Victims and Witnesses Unit.173
This Unit is charged with recommending protective procedures to
help victims and witnesses and with providing counseling for victims
and witnesses. 174 Ideally, this unit should suggest a number of protec-
tions for witnesses (beyond those discussed in Part III.B, supra) that
do not implicate defendants' confrontation rights.
For example, participation of witnesses before the Tribunal
should be voluntary and with informed consent.1 75 If participation of
witnesses is not completely voluntary, if witnesses are, even inadver-
tently, psychologically pressured to testify, everyone will be hurt. For
the witnesses, the experience would be traumatic. For the defendants
and the prosecutors, an involuntary witness is a poor source of infor-
mation. For the Tribunal's international image and reputation, the
172. Proposals, supra note 10, at 209.
173. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 507. Rule 34-Victims and
Witnesses Unit states in relevant part:
(A) There shall be set up under the authority of the Registrar a Victims and
Witnesses Unit consisting of qualified staff to:
(i) Recommend protective measures for victims and witnesses in accordance with
Article 22 of the Statute; and
(ii) provide counselling and support for them, in particular in cases of rape and
sexual assault.
(B) Due consideration shall be given, in the appointment of staff, to the employ-
ment of qualified women.
174. Id.
175. Proposals, supra note 10, at 206.
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damage to both the witnesses and the truth-seeking process would be
a dual blow.
For these reasons, the Tribunal probably does not contemplate or
desire involuntary witnesses. Unfortunately, the Tribunal does not
provide any explicit mechanisms to counter pressures to testify. Wit-
nesses may encounter pressure from well-meaning prosecutors who
are eager to convict, from well-meaning judges who zealously pursue
truth, and from well-meaning peers who have already testified, who
desire conviction, and who offer moral support.
Therefore, the Victims and Witnesses Unit should take several
steps to assure that witness testimony is voluntary and made with in-
formed consent. Two changes in the rules governing witnesses should
be suggested. First, an amendment to the rules should be made that
would permit a witness to stop testifying at any point that testifying
becomes too painful. If the witness later retakes the stand and com-
pletes cross-examination, then the testimony should be admitted as
evidence. Otherwise, the testimony should be stricken.
Second, the oath given by the witness, which currently covers
only truth, should be amended to reflect voluntariness, as per the rule
suggested above. Specifically, the oath should include a sentence stat-
ing "I give this testimony freely and voluntarily and understand my
right to cease testifying should I be, for any reason, unable to con-
tinue." This would remind everyone, including the witness involved,
of the importance of voluntary participation. It would also help de-
fray appeals or attacks of convictions on the grounds that witnesses
against the defendant were coerced into giving certain testimony.
Further, the counselors that the Victims and Witnesses Unit is
charged with providing should help the witness to understand the im-
plications of giving testimony and the right to not give testimony at
any time. In fact, witnesses and victims could benefit from two types
of counseling-legal and psychological. 176
Presumably, the rule creating the Unit, which speaks of counsel-
ing in general terms, does not contemplate legal counseling. 177 If the
Tribunal's rules contemplated providing lawyers for witnesses and vic-
tims, the role of those lawyers would probably be discussed through-
out the rules, which is not the case. Nevertheless, the Victims and
Witnesses Unit is certainly free to recommend the use of legal counsel
for witnesses and could probably provide legal counsel to give advice
outside of the Trial Chamber without the prior approval of the judges.
176. Proposals, supra note 10, at 205 (citing INT'L WOMEN'S HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC OF
THE CITY COLLEGE OF N.Y., GENDER JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 808 (1993); and sug-
gesting legal counseling); No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 117.
177. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11; supra note 174.
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Even if legal counsel for the witnesses were not permitted to par-
ticipate in the trial, legal counsel could serve an important role. As
mentioned above, the counsel could help to assure that the witness
understood that testifying was voluntary. The counsel could also help
prepare the witness for the rigors of the stand, sitting in on the prose-
cution's preparation of the witness with an eye toward the witness's
rights and needs.
In the Trial Chamber, an attorney for the witness could be even
more helpful. The attorney would be aware of potentially abusive and
harassing questions as well as questions in violation of the rape shield
rule and could make appropriate objections. Additionally, the physi-
cal presence of an attorney is comforting and may help the witness to
feel that her plight is being taken seriously.
The rule that provides defendants with the right to counsel during
investigation provides a good model on which to base an additional
rule providing witnesses with such a right.178 This is not to imply that
the position of witnesses is, or should be considered, comparable to
the defendants. Rather, the rule is logical for both groups. Specifi-
cally, the rule provides that defendants are entitled to counsel, shall be
informed of such right, and shall not be questioned absent counsel if
they desire to have counsel. Additionally, the rule provides for an
interpreter if one is needed. Witnesses ought to be afforded parallel
protections.
In addition to legal counseling discussed above and psychological
counseling already contemplated, witnesses could benefit further from
the presence of loved ones throughout Tribunal proceedings. 179
Again, nothing prevents the Victims and Witnesses Unit from assuring
the presence of close friends or family. The Unit need only recognize
the importance of such support. Similarly, the Unit would do well to
178. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 11, at 510-11. Rule 42-Rights of
Suspect During Investigation states in relevant part:
(A) A suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor shall have the following
rights, of which he shall be informed by the Prosecutor prior to questioning, in a
language he speaks and understands:
(i) the right to be assisted by counsel of his choice or to have legal assistance
assigned to him without payment if he does not have sufficient means to pay for
it; and
(ii) the right to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand
or speak the language to be used for questioning.
(B) Questioning of a suspect shall not proceed without the presence of counsel
unless the suspect has voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In case of waiver, if
the suspect subsequently expresses a desire to have counsel, questioning shall
thereupon cease, and shall only resume when the suspect has obtained or been
assigned counsel.
179. Proposals, supra note 10, at 206.
March 1995]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
consider group counseling, as witnesses will have similar experiences
inside and outside of the Trial Chambers.
Further, the judges and prosecutors who will be interacting with
the witnesses should be encouraged to undergo training aimed at in-
creasing sensitivity to victims' needs and fostering awareness of the
symptoms of trauma.180 Such training could help the judges in making
more humane and more accurate evidentiary determinations. For ex-
ample, observers who are unschooled in psychiatry may perceive gaps
in a witness's memory as a sign that the witness is disingenuous; how-
ever, certain memory blanks are a psychologically observable phe-
nomenon common among witnesses who have suffered trauma. 81
Without some basic psychological training, judges are liable to err in
evaluating testimony. Likewise, this training could be useful to judges
as they attempt to decide whether a witness has the psychological for-
titude to withstand public scrutiny, or if the proceedings should be
conducted in camera. Similarly, an understanding of victims' needs
could minimize speculation about the damage a particular question
might do and guide the judges in the proper application of the rape
shield rule.
Conclusion
If these additional suggestions for protecting witnesses are inade-
quate, then it will be necessary to consider abandoning the goal of
equality of arms. Hopefully, however, between these suggestions and
the protective rules already implemented by the Tribunal, witnesses
will be sufficiently protected.
The creation of the Tribunal was a lofty endeavor and those who
participate in the Tribunal's mission hopefully will be endowed with a
corresponding desire to promote universal justice. The goals for vic-
tim protection articulated in this Note are within reach. The Tribunal
needs only to implement them.
180. Proposals, supra note 10, at 202 & n.113.
181. No Justice, No Peace, supra note 10, at 109.
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